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Introduction
"Asia fascinates me, the long past of Asia, the achievements of Asia though
millennia of history, the troubled p~^esent o, f'Asia and the futut~e that is
taking shape almost before our eyes. "'
- Jawaharlal Nehn►
Long before Jawaharlal Nehru became India's first prime minister, he held a long
fascination with Asian unity in which China and India would play a central role. As
Prime Minister from 1947 to 1964, Nehru formulated a new direction for India's
international relations, which focused on Asia as a region for peace, anti-unperialism and
independence from the superpower blocs. Persuaded by Asian brotherhood among the
decolonized and those on the verge of decolonization, Nehru believed that with the rapid
dissolution of the European empires at the conclusion of the Second World War, Asia's
past historical links could now be reclaimed. Accordingly, the Sino—Indian relations
were closely woven into Nehru's idea of the emergence of Asia, and of India's pivotal
role in the new Asian cooperation. Thus, Nehru sought China's good relations,
nationalist or communist, and forged a foreign policy in which the People's Republic of
China (PRC) was a prominent partner. From 1949 through 1955, Nehru strengthened and
expanded Sino-Indian relations by mutual support in critical areas of national, regional
and international unportance. Despite these efforts and much to Nehru's regret, China
and India fought amonth-long but intense border war in 1962. This turn of events not
Jawaharlal Nehru, foreword to K.P.S. Menon's Delhi- Chungking: A Travel Diary, 1947,
Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, ed. Sarvepalli Gopal, Second Series, Vol. 2 (Jawaharlal Nehru
Memorial Fund, O~ord University Press, New Delhi, 1984), 406. (Hereafter cited as SWJN}.
only severed Sino-Indian relations, but it also ended Nehru's commitment to the Asian
internationalism that he nurtured for so long.
From India's pre-independence to 1955, Nehru's foreign policy of Asian
internationalism was deeply tested by the prerogatives of the nation-states. Inherent in
Nehru's worldview was a construction of Asian federation with a free India and a free
China taking the lead. Two internationalist moments emerged: the Panchsheel Treaty of
1954 and the Bandung Conference of 1955. Both left enduring legacies that still
reverberate today; but paradoxically, these seminal events sowed the seeds from which
Nehru's Nonaligned Movement (NAM) would arise. Far from the principle of Asian
fraternalism and cooperation, Nehru formed nonalignment as a national and political
demand in the age of nationalism, As a politician in power, Nehru ended up walking
away from his cherished vision of Asian solidarity and friendship with China,
succumbing to the nationalist currents of state building and the geopolitical trap of the
Cold War. The outcome of which was the Sino-Indian Border War of 1962 which
diminished Nehru's secured standing in the world's opinion and cut a deep wound in the
collective spirit of the Indian people. The war inflicted humiliation and bitterness that it
was attributed to Nehru's death two years after of a broken heart. 2
How did this dramatic reversal and complete rupture between India and China
occur in such a relatively short period? There is a consensus among historians that Tibet
was the cause of the deterioration of the Sino-Indian relations that painted to the year of
1959 when the Dalai Lama fled from Lhasa to India to seek asylum. In most cases,
Nehru's broken heart, see Ramachandra Guha, "Asian Clash Civilisations? Revisting the Sino-
Indian Conflict of 1962," Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLVI (November S, 2011): 44 & 45.
~a
historians focus on the flawed leadership of either China's Mao Zedong or Nehru in the
conte~ of the Tibetan question, and the handling of the Himalayan disputed borders and
territories. In these instances, historians either depict China as the aggressor and Nehru
as the idealist betrayed by Mao.3 Or in the opposite spectrum, Nehru was blamed for his
shortcomings as a leader and his naivety in thinking China shared a mutual interest in
Asian unity and Sino-Indian friendship.4 Other schools of thought have situated tensions
between India and China as a postcolonial legacy in which imperial intrigues and the
British Raj's manipulation of Himalayan frontiers and territories left a troubled
inheritance that led to conflicts In some accounts, scholars emphasize regional power
rivalry between India and China over their leadership in Asia.6 This last argument seeks
to explain how the push for regional influence over Asian neighbors informed the
construction of competitive nationalism in India and China that ultimately led to war.
Still, a final school of thought has underscored the role of the Cold War context and
geopolitics as a key reason for the Sino-Indian split.$ In all of these schools, the
deterioration of Sino-Indian. relations began with the Dalai Lama fleeing Tibet in 1959.
3 Anand Kishore D,.Mathur. "Nehru: The Architect of India's Foreign Policy," ed. Sobhag
Mather and Shankar Goyal, Spectrum ofNehru's Thought (New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1994), 131-
147.
4 Neville Maxwell, India's China War (London: Cape, 1970).
5 Karunakar Gupta, The Hidden History of the Sino-Indian Frontier (Calcutta: Minerva
Associates Publications, 1974). Alastair Lamb, Tibet, Chzna &India 1914-1950: A History oflmperial
Diplomacy (Hertingfordbury: Roxford Books, 1989).
6 John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry zn the 20th Century (Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 2001). Alastair Lamb, Tibet, China &India 1914-1950: A History of
Imperial Diplomacy (Hertingfardbury: Roxford Books, 1989).
~ Nehru's claims on Himalayan territories underpinned aspect of nationalism, see Steven
Hoffman, India's War with China (University California Press, 1990). Nehru on relations with the Chinese
as both in the realm of nationalism and political realism, see Girl Deshingkar, 'The IOTehru Fears Itevisit~d',
in Tan Chung, ed. AcYoss the Himalayan Gap: An Indian Qacest for UndeYstanding China (New I3elhi:
Gyan Publishing House, 1998); John Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the 20th CentuNy
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001); Benjamin Zachariah, Nehru (London: Routledge, ?004).
8 See Allen Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina (Anne Harbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1975).
Unlike these conventional arguments about Sino-Indian relations, this paper
locates the roots of conflict much earlier and in an unlikely place, the signing of the
Panchsheel Treaty of 1954. Panchsheel was a trade pact signed between China and India
and the first legal document that enunciated the famous Five Principles of Co-Existence.
In it, China and India promised to maintain friendly relations by adhering to mutual
respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non aggression;
mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; equality and cooperation for
mutual benefit; and peaceful co-existence. 9 In the Panchsheel Treaty, India conceded to
China its military, communication, postal and other rights inside Tibet, but the treaty did
not address or specify the Himalayan frontiers and shared borders immediately
contiguous to Tibet. In the case of Panchsheel, this thesis traces the ambiguities
bequeathed by the imperial legacy in territorial rights and sovereign claims; and how
Nehru and Mao attempted to resolve them with the Panchsheel Treaty, which articulated
the need for friendship but failed to resolve their border issues.
The second event that pushed for the deterioration of the Sino-Indian relations
was the first Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955, following on the
heels of the signing of the treaty of Panchsheel in 1954. Twenty-nine recently
decolonized states or semi-decolonized states came together to address Asian problems
and solutions.10 To this day, it is still honored as the historic moment when the "people
of color" and of the "people of the oppressed" stood up for themselves to resist the
See I~idia, Panchsheel (Publications Division, Minishy of Information and Broadcasting, Govt.
of India, 1957).
10 Twenty-three Asian states attended: Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, China, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippuies, Saudi Arabia, Syria,
Thailand, Turkey, North and South Vietnam and Yemen. There were six African nations: Egypt, Ethiopia,
the Gold Coast, Liberia, Libya, and Sudan.
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continuing cabal of Western imperialism.11 Conceived by the Five Colombo Powers,
Bandung represented an exclusively race-based gathering of developing countries as a
resistance to Cold War politics.12 It was supposedly a unified assembly on the sole basis
of shared historical experience in colonialism and racism among the newly independent
states. But for the first time, Asian leaders came together not as activists and
revolutionaries of anti-colonial movements, but as politicians in power. Thus, Bandung
would expose the differences among the delegates as they were essentially divided into
two columns, those who opposed Western imperialism and those who were anti-
communism.
While Panchsheel and Bandung are acclaimed in the minds of the formerly
colonized peoples in Asia and Africa, far from being the unifying instruments, this thesis
argues that internationalist moment forcibly hastened the deterioration of relations
between India and China and the demise of Nehru's vision of Pan-Asian solidarity.
Panchsheel exposed divisions between India and China while Bandung revealed the
underlying tensions among the Asian delegates that spelled out the end of a long-time
foreign policy endeavor of Nehru's internationalism, the crux of which was a closer
partnership with China. The implications of Bandung and the Panchsheel Treaty on Sino-
11 Reporting nn the significance of Bandung from one of the perspectives of the ` oppressed,'
Richard Wright, American writer, activist, poet was the voice for an entire generation of black Americans.
His works won critical praises for portraying racism and violence in American South. Among the foreign
correspondents covering the conference, Richard Wright was probably the only black American. His first-
handpersonal account in Bandung, chronicled in The Color Curtain is widely referenced and quoted in
numerous writings analyzing the conference. Richard Wright, The Color Curtain, A Report on the Bandung
Conference (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1956). (Hereafter cited as Color
Cui^twin).
1Z The original impetus for the Bandung Conference emerged with the Colombo Five, regional
powers in Asia: India's Nehru, Indonesia's Sukarno, Burma's U Nu, Ceylon's Kotelawala (Neutrals), and
Pakistan's Ali (Western-allied).
Indian relations would make themselves felt in 1959 when the first shot was fired in the
Himalayan frontier that signaled the sundering of their relations. But the seeds of the
conflict were sown earlier as this thesis demonstrates.
This paper is organized into two main chapters prefaced by the introduction and
followed by a conclusion and bibliography. The first chapter expands on the Panchsheel
Treaty of 1954, which enunciated the Five Principles of Peaceful-Co-e~stence. India
became Panchsheel's most impassioned proponent as it was compatible with Nehru's
neutrality and pacifist approach to international relations. It argues that the premise of
Panchsheel was that nation-states in Asia had to respect each others' state borders and the
national sovereignty of neighbors. This approach was inherently flawed in that it was
designed as a tool to secure cooperation and peace, but by emphasizing national borders
and territories as the primary determinant of sovereignty, the treaty, even as it sought to
encourage peace, paradoxically, heightened the tensions between India and China over
their unsettled borders. Thus, the treaty reinforced a stronger position on territorial
possessions and fixed boundaries that reduced the possibilities of Nehru's hopes for
internationalist solidarities and friendship between India and China. Ultimately, the
primacy of state imperatives to push for national interests above all became more
pronounced in the treaty, and this created a crisis in Nehru's internationalist vision of
Asia.
The second chapter centers on the Bandung Conference of 1955. Although it was
heralded as the zenith of Asian relations and the peak of Nehru's foreign policy
achievement, two issues are worth noting in Bandung. While it invoked the spirit of
Asian solidarity in the periphery, the participating Asian countries were not harmonious.
D
Second, the discordant atmosphere in Bandung and the divisions between the Western-
allied and neutral nation-states would foreshadow a new shift in Nehru's foreign policy.
He wauld eventually abandon his Asian internationalism and with it would follow the
demise of his close association and friendship with the Chinese.
In resituating the history of tensions between India and China in these critical
events in the early 1950s, this thesis makes several important contributions. It debunks
the myths of Asian cooperation in Panchsheel and Bandung by exposing the national
pressures undermining such efforts to construct peace and solidarity in Cold War Asia.
This thesis challenges the conventions that these moments were the hallmarks of bilateral
relations between India and China. As head of anation-state, Nehru's expressions of
internationalism and Asian solidarity could not be sustained when domestic political
forces of nation building predominantly occupied the priorities of his national agenda.
By exposing the ways Indian internationalist ideas were incompatible with the political
reality in Cold War Asia, this thesis reveals the repercussions of the two moments in
China and India relations that seemed to promote peace but actually crested greater
tensions between them. In Panchsheel, the Five Principles highlight the incompatibility of
seeking peace against an unsettled and contested national boundary. In Bandung, the
event marks the closure of Nehru's Asian solidarity and with it, as ~ consequence, the end
of the close partnership with China.
Chapter One
Panchsheel
If Panchsheel is fully and sincerely accepted by all counties, peace would be assured
ever ywhere, and cooperatio~t would follow. "13
- Jawaharlal Nehru
It was 1954, the apogee of the Sino-Indian relations when Beijing and New Delhi
signed the Panchsheel Treaty or the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-E~stence. Earlier
that year, Premier Zhou Enlai visited Delhi where locals chanted in the streets in India,
"Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai," the Chinese and Indians are brothers, a popular slogan
illustrating the touchstone of their friendship. Late that year, Nehru made a reciprocal
visit to Beijing, his first, and received a warm and unprecedented welcome of which
"millions" of Chinese greeters lined the streets, an overwhelming evidence of the
people's "basic urges for friendship with India."14 More than ever, Nehru was convinced
that the immemorial friendship between India and China was headed in the right
direction.
The premise of the Sino-Indian Treaty of 1954, as it was called then and later
adapted as the Panchsheel Treaty, was to put in place a set of interstate benchmarks of
cooperation and friendship among nations, ones that would be a model for the rest of the
13 Jawaharlal Nehru, from a speech at the civic reception for Mr. Bulgarin and Mr. Khruschev in
Calcutta, November 30, 1955. See India's Foreign Policy, Selected Speeches, September 1946—April 1961
(Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Publications Division, New Delhi
1961),101. (Hereafter cited as India's Foreign Policy).
14 
`<Jawaharlal Nehru,'Note on Visit to China and Indo-China'," November 14,1954, History and
Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archives Department of Myanmar, Ascension Number
203, Series 12/3, "Letter from Jawaharlal Nehru to U Nu, relating to Note on Visit to China and Indo-China
(16.11.54)" Obtained by You Chen~ue. http://di~italarchive.wilsoncenter.or,g/document/121651 (accessed
April 15, 2015).
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global community to emulate. A central dimension of Nehru's Asian internationalism,
the treaty's preamble enshrined the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: mutual
respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression,
mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and cooperation for
mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence. is
Yet, the Panchsheel Treaty, in which India relinquished its extraterritorial rights
over Tibet, failed to accomplish what was of paramount importance for India's and
China's sense of national territorial integrity and sovereignty. The treaty neglected to
address the physical and geographic delineation of their shared 2,500 miles of contiguous
borders from the west to the east end of the Indo-Tibetan borders. Although the intention
of Panchsheel with its Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence was to promote
principled and peaceful behavior in international foreign relations, the treaty presented a
double-edged sword for two Asian countries with poorly delineated borders. By
emphasizing territorial integrity and sovereignty as the fundamental basis for peaceful co-
existence, the treaty opened up a new and highly volatile point of contention between
states with ambiguously defined and contested borders. The premise of all Five
Principles depended on mutual recognition and respect of their shared border, and
ironically this was one of the gravest contentions between them. Thus, deeply embedded
and fundamental to a treaty specifically designed to ensure peace and friendship were the
one paint of contention destined to drive a wedge between the two emerging regional
powers in Asia.
15 India, Leading Events in India-China Relations, 1947-1962 (New Delhi: External Publicity
Division, Ministry of External Affairs, 1962), 3. (Hereafter cited as Leading Events). Also see India,
Panchsheel (Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India, 1957}.
At first, what started as a low profile treaty in 1954 became a watermark in
international cooperation.16 Beijing and Delhi worked together to push for the
acceptance of Panchsheel, so that, "every nation would abide by its norms."17 The joint
statements from the two Prime Ministers, Jawaharlal Nehru and thou Enlai, at the
adoption of Panchsheel, declared:
"If these principles are applied, not only between various countries but also in
international relations generally, they would form a solid foundation for peace and
security and the fears and apprehensions that exist today would give place to a
feeling of confidence.....The Prime Ministers expressed their confidence in the
friendship between India and China which would help the cause of world peace
and the peaceful development of their respective countries as well as the other
countries of Asia." 1S
The Third World countries were the first to endorse the Five Principles of Co-
Existence, which were also embraced later by the socialist blocs of Yugoslavia and the
Soviet Union. 19 A year later, the United States also accepted Panchsheel in "words and
deeds."20 Britain declared Panchsheel as the basis of the Commonwealth. 21 The rapid
acceptance of Panchsheel internationally was the realization of the Asian solidarity that
Nehru had hoped to see come to fruition. Years later, India played a considerable part
16 jronically, Nehru's Panchsheel came from a Toes-profile treaty in 1954 and was signed by
second-tier ambassadorial consuls in India and China. Even the original name signifies its minor status:
The Agreement an Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India. The treaty detailed
specifics pilgrim routes and trading posts in Gartok, Gyantse, and Yatung inside Tibet where Indian
military escorts and police were stationed. Renewal in eight years, the treaty outlined the settlement of
pending problems through goodwill and cooperation. An exchange of notes followed to deal with the
transfer of the post, telegraph and telephone services, and rest houses from the Government of India to the
People's Republic of China.
17 "Minutes of Chairman Mao Zedong's Third Meeting with Nehru," October 26, 1954, History
and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, PRCMFA 204-00007-17, 135-142. Obtained by Chen Jian and
translated by Chen Zhihong. http://di~italarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117828 (Accessed: April 15,
2015). The minutes of their meeting touched on the international promotion of Panchsheel.
18 India, Panchsheel, Append. Also see India, Leadissg Events, 4.





together with other countries, such as Yugoslavia and Sweden, to pass a resolution
unanimously in the adoption of the Five Principles at the United Nations on December
11, 1957.22 It would be hailed as one of the major foreign policy achievements for India.
Looming large in Panchsheel was the contradiction between international
cooperation and national imperatives. Nehru's inclination to support Asian fraternity
came into direct conflict with the national prerequisites of security and boundary setting
designed to uphold India's vital national interests. In the age of crumbling empires and
rapid decolonization, fundamental to a new nation-state such as India and China were the
international recognition of the legitimacy of its nationhood, a cohesive national identity
based on territoriality.23 The international and practical normative formation of
nationhood was tied to a geographical territory, a fixed and 'unmovable boundary. For
Nehru's India, the sovereignty of the Indian nation was closely linked to the integrity of
its territory, starting from the north of its mighty Himalayan frontiers to the souCh of its
maritime tip point. With the trauma of the subcontinent's vivisection during Partition in
1947, Nehru's outmost national exigency was maintaining the status quo in retaining all
imperial territorial inheritance; expanding cartographic domains by wresting control over
Pondicherry and Goa from the French and Portuguese respectively; and delegitimizing
ZZ On ITN resolution on co-existence, see speech in Lok Sabha, December 17, 1957, Indza's
Foreign Policy, 102-104.
23 The ideal of a strong nation-state was inspired by Wilson's Fourteen-Point declaration, which
called for a nation's self-determination after the break up of the European empires. The idea of a nation
state was centered on one people and one nation. As decolonization occurred, subject peoples and nations
aimed to gain the nation-state status for international recognition. Therefore, territorial sovereignty and
boundary setting became the noun in forging nation-state personhood. See Iriy Abraham, How Indza
Became Territorial: Foreign Policy, Diaspora, Geopolitics (California: Stanford IIniversity Press, 2014),
46-72.
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claims counter to India's own interests in disputed territories with Pakistan and China's
administered Tibet.
Mao, not unlike Nehru, had the same national imperatives: reclaiming China's
rightful. place in the region, dismantling the unequal treaties of the imperial past and
recovering those territories lost during the last century, one China characterized as the
national humiliation in the hands of foreign imperialists.24 And because the
revolutionary government squarely-viewed itself as the legitimate inheritor and
government of the Chinese republic, not the Guomindang of Jiang Jieshi in Taiwan, the
urgency of recovering these territories was foremost in the PRC's national agenda.
Furthermore, it had fought bloodier wars, and the People's Republic was not adversely
against using force in a conflict. Thus, the unsettled Himalayan territory was simmering
to a boiling point in which afull-blown conflict was on the horizon.
The irony of the Panchsheel Treaty was that, according to the document,
territorial boundaries defined the terms of peace between two nation-states. This
presented a unique problem for China and India, states with conflicting perceptions of
their borderlands and territorial sovereignty. In particular, the areas contiguous to Tibet
were in question. Instead of unifying the two neighbors in peace, as Nehru hoped, the
paradox of Panchsheel was that it became the trigger that forced India and China to
confront one another on the boundaries that served as the basis of their peace treaty. This
contradiction forced the two Asian states into confrontation much sooner and more
24 Communist Chinese international relations were informed by the national identity Mao heavily
identified with, the victiinhood identity through a century of humiliation. The national goals: ending
remnants of imperialism and colonialism, restoring Chinese territorial sovereignty and integrity, and
continuing the momentum of socialist revolution in the domestic arena and abroad. See Nianlong Han,
Diplomacy of Contemporary China (Hong Kong: New Harizon Press, 1990); John Garver, The Foreign
Relations of the People's Republic of China (Prentice —Hall, Inc. Englewood, Cliffs, N.J., 1993); Based on
new documentary evidence made available by the Chinese government in 1990s, see Jian Chen, Mao and
the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).
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forcefully by underscoring the prerequisite of mutually agreed upon boundaries. In the
end, the Asian solidarity that marked the inauguration of Panchsheel was supplanted and
undermined by the overwhelming national imperatives confronting Nehru and Mao in a
treaty destined to bring them into conflict over the borders they both claimed sovereignty
over.
I. Nehru's Asianism and Internationalism Before and During Panchsheel
The idea of Asian unity captivated Jawaharlal Nehru long before the Indian
republic's independence. For Nehru, the Asian map was a broad canvas of shared
cultural heritage and established historical links through the spread of Buddhism and
centuries of cross-border and interstates commerce.'S Born from his early experiences in
nationalist and international movements, Nehru mapped out, as a priority, the restoration
of the historical and cross-cultural ties among Asian peoples. As an inherent Indian
sensibility, leis internationalism reflected a distinctive Asian "inflection" invoking Asian
thoughts and themes.26 Nehru's transformative experience outside of the subcontinent in
the late 1920s, crystallized for him the immediacy of associating with other colonized
countries to form a collective movement in their struggle for liberation. Nehru's
preoccupation with Asian solidarity had its roots in his travels abroad, including his times
with the League Against Imperialism (LAI) in Brussels. In fact, the league imbued his
ZS On the influence of Buddhism, see Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (New York: The
John Day Company, 1946), 192 — 193 (Hereafter cites as Discovery of India); see also Jawaharlal Nehru,
Glimpses of WoYld History: Being Further Letters to His Daughter, Written in Prison, and Containing a
RarrablingAccount ofHzstory for Young People (New York, N.Y.: The John Day Company, 1942), 114.
(Hereafter cited as Glimpses of World History).
26 Carolien Stolte, "Orienting India: Interwar Internationalism in an Asian Inflection, 1917-1937"
(PhD. Diss., University of Leiden, 2013), 5. The author asserts that Indian internationalism was an
"`invocation of 'Asia' by Indian men and women from every possible religious and political affiliation."
Hence, Nehru embodied this characterization. Stolte, 5.
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worldview with swell-blended mixture of national anti-colonialism and international
anti-imperialism. 27 The meeting at the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities in Brussels
in 1927 gave Nehru two salient aims: the call for cooperation and solidarity between
India and China, then the Nationalist government, and the imperative to "contest empires"
by connecting with other anti-imperialists and national movements worldwide.z8
Furthermore, the encounters he made with revolutionaries, e~les, labor activists, and
tirade unionists, thinkers and academics would form a durable connection, Thirty years
later, the contacts he made in this period would meet again and resurrect the Brussels
spirit in Bandung.29
So it was consistent for Nehru to advocate solidarity among his Asian
counterparts against Western imperialism even after assuming the leadership of the
largest democracy in the region. He led the international resistance against the Dutch on
Indonesia' behalf in 1947, facilitated the Korean armistice between China and the United
States in 1952, and upheld the rights of the PRC and smaller nations to be represented in
the United Nations. These were interventions compatible to his internationalist
sentiments with "Indian inflection."
27 Nehru's internationalism is attributed to his years abroad in Brussels. On Nehru's
internationalist moments in the interwar years, see Michele Louro, "India and the League Against
Imperialism: A Special Blend' of Nationalism and Internationalism," ed., Ali Raza, Franzika Roy,
Benjamin 2achariah, The InternationaZistMoment, South Asia, Worlds, and World Views, 1917-39 (Sage
Publications; New Delhi, 2015). (Hereafter cited as A Special ` Blend' of Nationalism and
InternationaZisnz), 22-55.
28 Michele Louro, "At Home in the World: Jawaharlal Nehru and Global Anti-Imperialism" (PhD.
Diss., Temple University, 2011), 41-65.
29 In the opening speech by President Soekarno at the opening of the Asian —African Conference
in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955, he fondly said, " I recall in this connectiop the conference of the ` League
Against Imperialism and Colonialism' which was held in Brussels almost 30 years ago. At that Conference
many distinguished delegates who are present here today met each other and found new strength in their
fight for independence." See George McTurnan Kahin, The Asian African Conference, Bandung,
Indonesia, April 1955 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956), Appendix.
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The affinity between China and India in Nehru's mind had roots in ancient
linkages of 2000 years of friendship and cross-border exchanges that spread Buddhism in
China. The Nobel laureate and the great Bengali poet, Rabindranath Tagore, whom
Nehru greatly admired and who exulted in Chinese culture and history, often celebrated
this civilizational connection. 30 An avid Asian devotee, Tagore promoted the
spiritualism of Asian identity and chastised the "shameless humanity" and "the barbaric
greed" of the Europeans. Chinese scholarship in India flourished in Tagore's
international university in Santiniketan, where the Cheena Bhavana (Institute of Chinese
Language and Culture) was founded in 1937. Nehru's own and only daughter, Indira was
sent to study in Santiniketan. Tagore's idea of a cultural and historical bridge between the
two nations was celebrated in Nehru's book, the Discovery of India, written just five
years after Tagore's death in 1941,31
Another significant journey for Nehru was his travel to the Soviet Union in 192?
during the Tenth Aimiversary of the October Revolution. Impressed by his visit, Nehru
serialized his experiences in several articles. Published as a book called Soviet Russia in
1929, it promoted socialist ideas and reported on the progress of the Soviets. In Discovery
of India, Nehru wrote, "I had no doubt that the Soviet Revolution had advanced human
3o Tagore first exposure to "One Asia" theme was with the Japanese Okakura, the pan-Asianist
at the turn of the 20`~ century, which started the cultural bridge between Asia and South Asia.
However, Japan's imperialist ambitions disqualified it from the spiritualism which defined Tagore's and
most Asianists' idea of the Asian character. Tagore's and Nehru's japan connection was completely severed
in 1937 at the outbreak of Sino-Japanese War. See Carolien Stolte, "Orienting India: Intei~var
Internationalism in an Asian Inflection, 1917-1937" (PhD. Diss., University of Leiden, 2013), 75 — 9Q.
31 
Nehru referenced China 143 times in his book the Discovery of India, and he mentioned China
847 times in Glimpses of World History. Tagore's influence in Nehru's internationalism, see Ramachandra
Guha, "What Nehru Owned to Tagore," The Hindu, (November 23, 2008),
http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-features/tp-sundayma~azine/what-nehru-owed-to-
ta~ore/articlel437824.ece. (accessed April 15, ZO15).
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society by a great leap and had lit a bright flame which would not be smothered."32 As
opposed to the exploitative nature of capitalism, Nehru was quite impressed with what he
perceived as the egalitarian quality of the socialism he witnessed there. Quite a changed
man was Nehru coming back home from the Soviet Union, he wrote in his
autobiography, "My outlook was wider, and nationalism by itself seemed to me a
definitely narrow and insufficient creed." He continued, "Without social freedom and a
socialistic structure of society and the state, neither the country nor the individual could
develop much." 33 These sentiments would predispose Nehru to sympathize with socialist
states such as Soviet Russia and China and to consider socialism as an economic model
in modernizing India.
At the time of Indian independence, Nehru emphasized that the time was right for
the restoration of "Asian eminence on the world stage" and India was ready to take part
in that leadership role.34 Predictively, five months before independence, Nehru held the
first Asian Relations Conference (ARC) in New Delhi in April 1947. In the inaugural
address, Nehru declared the "Asian awakening in a new era of fellowship that
championed peace, freedom and progress."35 The idea of an Asian Federation as a
resistance among the colonized people attained considerable traction in Nehru and the
National Congress Party's leadership. Once India assumed its independence later in
August 1947, Nehru put in place an independent foreign policy centered on
internationalism. From pre-independence to 1955, Nehru was preoccupied with assisting
3z Jawarhalal Nehru, Discovery oflndia, 15.
33 7awarhalal Nehru, An Autobiography (London, 1939), 126-128.
3a Jawaharlal Nehru, Address to Army officers, October 19, 1946, SWJN, Vol, 2, 311.
3s Nehru's address to the plenary session of the Asian Conference Relations of 1947. Asian
Relations, Being Report of the Proceedings and Documentation of the First Asian Relations Conference,
New Delhi, March April, 1947 (New Delhi, India: Asian Relations Organization, 1948), 22-25.
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in the anti-colonial struggles of the newly independent Asian countries. Foremost in his
agenda was ending foreign domination in Asia and forging international peace and
cooperation.36
In this reimagining of Asia, Nehru saw an ally, an equal in greatness, and of
historical importance in China, whom he described as "that mighty country with a mighty
past, our neighbor, has been our friend through the ages and that friendship will endure
and grow."37 Nehru heralded the "two freedom-loving nations," India's and China's
civilizational eminence in antiquity and exulted these bonds as "far deeper and more
abiding than political bonds" could ever be.38 China's central role and partnership with
India, as validated by the centuries-old kinship of shared history and recent independent
struggles were the foundation of Nehru's Asian vision. Nehru saw their mutual goal of
ending imperialism and colonialism paired with the freedom struggle for other
decalonized nations in Asia as the path to Asian independence. The reunification of
China in 1949, Nehru surmised, was "the most important fact in Asia and the world
today."39 "Some are afraid of it," he explained, "some welcome it, but whether we like it
or not, it is an event of the highest importance in the present and in the future."40 So
resisting US efforts to contain China would be a pillar of Nehru's foreign policy and "a
36 Sawaharlal Nehru, Discovery oflndia, 416.
37 Jawaharlal Nehru, speech made on first broadcast over all India Radio as Vice President of the
interim government, September 7, 1946. India's Forezgn Policy, 3; SWJ1V, Vol. 2, 407.
38 Jawaharlal Nehru, "Two freedom-loving nations," SWJN, Vol. 9, 209. "The far deeper and
more abiding./....political bonds," quoted from the letter sent to Professor Tan Yu-Shan, General Secretary
of the Sino-Indian Cultural Society, SWJN, vol. 9, 469.
39 Jawaharlal Nehru, Parthasarathi, G., ed. Jawaharlal Nehru: Letters to Chief Ministers, 1947-
1964, Vol. 2, 1950 —1952 (Delhi: Distributed by O~ord University Press, 1985), January 18, 1950, 16.




key component of his effort as an Asian leader."41 Notwithstanding, he saw the
communists' victory strictly through the lens of a national liberation struggle, in line with
India's anti-colonial and anti-imperial internationalism. Nehru confirmed this belief: `Z
have always thought that it is important, even essential if you like, that these two
countries of Asia, India, and China, should have friendly and as far as possible
cooperative relations."42 Within this framework, China, and Asian solidarity became the
cornerstone ofpost-independent India's foreign policy.
Nehru's international activism was to galvanize Asians to come together through
international conferences and to lend his voice to their concerns and priorities for self-
determination. An inspiring demonstration of this was Nehru's initiatives in organizing
the Asian Relations Conference in April 1947, months before the transfer of power and
the Second New Delhi Conference in January 1949 to provide concrete support to the
Indonesian government against the Dutch by pressuring the ITN Security Council to end
hostilities there. By early 1950, Nehru was hard at work to befriend the Chinese and was
representing their interests in many critical areas while the Chinese were embroiled in the
struggle against US containment and encirclement 43 In Nehru's assessment, China and
41 
Mohammad Yunus, Reflections on China: An Arrtbassador's View from Being (Lahore,
Pakistan: Wajidalis, 1986), 102.
4z 
India, Ministry of External Affairs, Prime Minister on Srno-Indian Relations: In Parlian2ent
(New Delhi, Government of India Press, 1961), Vol. 1, 115. See also, India's Foreign Policy, 344.
43 
media was among the first countries to recognize the government of the People's Republic of
China in 1950; Ambassador to Peking, K.M. Panikkar of India, became Premier Zhou Enlai's intermediary
and served as back charuiel envoy in communicating with the US and its allies that China intended to go to
war if the iJN forces crossed the 38~' parallel in Korea; India opposed efforts to condemn the PRC for
"aggression" in Korea; India proposed guidelines for Korean War armistice; India lobbied for the PRC to
assume China's seat at the United Nations. India lobbied relentlessly to seat the PRC at the United Nations,
even rejecting, in protest, the offer to take China's seat at the Security Council. Additional notable
contributions of Nehru on behalf the PRC: During the negotiations of the San Francisco Treaty or Peace
Treaty with japan in 1951, formally ending World War II and allocating provisions on the status of Taiwan,
Nehru fought for the PRC to be represented. He was not successful, but he nevertheless insisted on
fE:3
India shared similar problems and therefore, they should draw close together. As partners
in a New Asia, with their combined talent, working capability, and geographical
situation, they would grow strong and "there is nothing to stop them.fr44 SO, Nehru legally
alleviated the area of possible contentious and potential disagreement between China and
India, that of the status of Tibet. This was formalized in the Panchsheel Agreement of
1954, officially recognizing Tibet as a part of China. Nehru's well-intentioned
diplomatic mediation and concessions were his way of building an enduring friendship,
despite incompatibilities in their belief systems.
R. Tibet and the Himalayan Boundaries in the Center of the Storm
One Himalayan size obstacle stood in the way of Nehru's vision of Asian
internationalism and Sino-Indian solidarity after independence in 1947. It was the
question of Tibet and the ambiguous boundaries separating India, China and Tibet.
Straddled between two great powers, Tibet was of strategic importance for British India
as a buffer zone or as an extension of power projection for China's imperial rule. India
and Tibet had cultural and religious ties through the spread of Buddhism and subsequent
pilgrimages and trade exchanges across borders; while China had centuries of historical
connection including the traditional status of "suzerainty" over Tibet.45 Both nationalists
providing the PRC a forum to declare Chinese wishes far Japan to renounce its claim over Taiwan. In
1954, Nehru paved the way for China to participate in Geneva Convention in the peace settlement in
Indochina. Nehru advocated for the PRC to be included in the LTN discussion to come into a solution to the
crisis in the Taiwan Strait. See also Jolui Garver, Protracted Rzvalry, 117-119. On India's role as mediator
in the Korean War, see K. M. Panikkar, In Two Chinas, Menznirs of a Diplomat (London: G. Allen &
Unwin,1955), 108-110.
~ Jawaharlal Nehru, see speech during debate on Foreign Affairs in Lok Sabha, September 30,
1954, India's Foreign Policy, 305.
45 China, Nationalists or Communists, regarded Tibet as part of China. For centuries, the
relationship between China and Tibet was cyclical based on the power balance in the region. When a
strong Chinese dynasty was in place, Tibet sought Chinese protection. On occasion, appointments of the
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and the communists, concerning Tibet, shared the belief that this land was historically
part of China.46 However, after the revolution that toppled the Manchu Dynasty, Tibet
became nominally free as the central Chinese government was too weak to exert any
jurisdiction over the land-locked state.
Separating India's and China's Tibet were the long, inhospitable, and contested
territories in the east, west and central sectors of the 2,500 miles of the Himalayan
frontiers. In the eastern sector, southeast of Tibet is the frontier that intersects India's
administered North East Frontier Agency (NEFA, now called Arunachal Pradesh),
essentially the McMahon Line, which was the main contention in the border dispute, and
Burma (Myanmar). In the western sector, the protruding triangular mount of Aksai Chin
crisscrosses the west of Tibet, India's northwestern part of Kashmir and China's Xinjiang
province (Appendix I).
The entanglement of Tibet that would bedevil the Sino-Indian relations could be
traced back to the controversial Simla Conference of 1914. The British Foreign
Secretary, Henry McMahon, drew a map of the eastern sector of the boundary that he
hoped would be recognized by representatives from Britain, Tibet, and the Chinese
government. At any time before, boundaries between India and Tibet had never been
formally defined. Traditionally, Tibet was of premium strategic importance for British
Dalai Lama were decided with China's assistance. The historical relationships bordered on a tributary and
as a protectorate in nature. These historical antecedents provided the credence, in China's perspective, of
its claim over Tibet. See Shakya Tsering, The Dragon in the Land ofSnows: A History of Modern Tibet
Since 1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
as Goumindang and PRC were succinct in their aim to recover lost territories from foreign
incursions. Regarding Tibet, General Chiang Kai-Shek lamented, "In the territory of China a hundred years
ago, compromising more than ten million square kilometers, there was not a single district that was not
essential to the survival of the Chinese nation." Aud Mao informed Edgar Snow as early as 1936, "The
unmediate task of China was to regain all of our lost territories... The Mohammedan and Tibetan peoples
for autonomous republics attached to the Chinese Federation." Quoted from Allen Whiting, Chinese
Calculus of Deterrence (Anne Harbor, University of Michigan Press, 1975), 7-9.
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India as a genuine buffer state. The redrawn map (later known as the McMahon Line)
essentially extended the boundaries in the northeastern sector, incorporating roughly
40,000 square miles of territories that were inhabited by ethnically of "Mongolian"
extraction and pushing northeastward covering a portion of northern Burma. The
McMahon Line, located in India's Northeast, is only a portion of the 2,500 miles of the
continuous boundary separating Tibet and India, but it was the most significant for
British India as it defined the "best protection for the common border" between India and
Tibet.47 The British and Tibetan delegates signed the accord, while the Chinese
representative, in protest, refused to sign it.
Shelved for thirty-two years, the Simla accord became dormant until 1937 when
the Deputy Foreign Secretary, 01af Caroe, decided to resurrect the McMahon Line as the
basis for British policy in the Himalaya. In 1943, British India faced threats from World
War II including possible penetration from the Soviet Union and Japan. Concerned about
a possible breach in security, the British Raj unilaterally decided to establish the
McMahon Line as the official border without further consultation from the Tibetans or
the Chinese. Since the imperial rule of the Manchu and subsequent governments of the
Guomindang and the People's Republic of China, Tibet had always been considered an
integral part of China. In practice, the disarray in the Chinese republican government
enabled British India to exercise diplomatic and extraterritorial rights inside Tibet.48
Nehru would relinquish these rights in the Panchsheel Agreement of 1954, but the exact
47 Alastair Lamb, Tibet., China &India 1914-1950: A History o, flmperial Diplomacy,
(Hertingfordbury: Ro~cfard Books, 1989), 143. The Northwestern map of Aksai Chin, barren and
inhabitable, was not a concern in terms of threat as Nehru concluded, not even "a blade of grass grows"
there. See India Foreign Policy, 349.
48 Three major trade routes and destinations inside Tibet: Yatung, Gyantse, and Gartok where
Indian military troops were stationed, including Indian guesthouses, post, telegraph and communication
services inside Tibet.
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status or alignment of the McMahon Line was never discussed nor any general reference
to the Indo-Tibetan border. As such, the borders remained undefined from the Chinese
perspective. But for Nehru, the Himalayan frontiers were "clear and awell-known fact"
as settled,49
When the People's Republic of China (PRC) was proclaimed in 1949, the
Government of India (GOI) extended official recognition to the unified China. By
August of 1950, the GOI brought to the PRC the concerns of unsettled conditions across
the border, meaning the remnants of trade routes, safe houses and sma11 Indian troops
inside Tibet. Thus the GOI urged that Sino-Tibetan relations should be adjusted through
peaceful talks and to stabilize the Sino-Indian border. While still in negotiation, the
Chinese troops entered Tibet on October 7, 1950, out of concern that foreign intrigue or
elements were to detach Tibet from China. The invasion of Tibet caused the GOI to
censure the PRC's military action in Tibet. In return, the PRC criticized India "as having
been affected by foreign influences hostile to China in Tibet." 50 In spite of the harsh
language from the Chinese, Nehru was resigned to the fact that neither Tibet, nor GOI,
would have stopped the Chinese march to Tibet or that "any foreign power can prevent
it" from occurring.51 As Nehru recognized that China's Tibet would pose a problem,
Nehru sought once more to reestablish relations with the Chinese. The Indian
government initiated talks with the PRC in the later months of 1952.52 After the signing
4g India, Leading Events in India-China Relations, 5.
so 
mid., 2.
sl Jawaharlal Nehru, "Policy Regarding China and Tibet," November 18, 1950, SWJN, vol. 15
(pant 2), 343. The Chinese referred to the march to Tibet as liberating Tibet; whereas the Indian referred to
it as the Chinese invasion of Tibet.
SZ See Letters to Chief Ministers, Vol. 3, 1952-I9S4, Letter dated August 2, 1952, 75.
K.M.Pannikar, envoy to Beijing, informed Nehru on June 15, 1952 that Zhou had agreed to discuss about
Tibet but presumed that India had no intention of claiming "special rights arising fiom the unequal treaties
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of the treaty of Panchsheel in 1954, Nehru and Mao continued in efforts to mitigatE the
volatile issue of Tibet.
The dilemma of unsettled borders and contested territories was not unique to Mao
and Nehru. Nehru's ascendancy to the helm of the Indian nation-state was accompanied
by the immediate border dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir. At the heart of the
territorial predicament between India and China were these questions: Who had the
ultimate authority to decide each nation-state's "territorial integrity and sovereignty"
when the borders delineated "territorial integrity" were in question? Since appropriating
lands of the nation-states was based on power politics, would there be even a possible
mutual respect for one side or the other? How would one country settle border disputes
within the framework of Asian solidarity?
Inherent in the Five Principles of Co-e~stence was the premise that an
established consensus on border delineation between countries had already existed. But
the boundaries in the Himalayas had not been officially defined between the two regional
powers. Crucial to the assumption of the newly independent states was the integrity of
one's national boundary. If the physical frontiers identifying the nation's statehood were
contested, then, the validity of a nation's ascendancy would also be put into question.53
Although the language of the principles appeared to be morally sound, they could not
mitigate the intrinsic volatility attached to the status of the undefined frontiers.
of the past and was prepared to negotiate a new and permanent relationship safeguarding legitimate
interests."
s3 See Itty Abraham, How India Became TeNritorial: Foreign Policy, Diaspora, Geopolitics
(California: Stanford University Press, 2014). Abraham argues that the fixed territorial homeland as a
starting point for international recognition as well as establishing national identity defines the root of
contemporary Asian urtestate territorial conflicts after decolonization.
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Territorial disputes were common after decolonization and big countries like
China still clung to its irredentism in cases of Tibet, Xinjiang, Mongolia, and Taiwan.
Correspondingly, India's territorial disputes extended to its Northwest region of Jammu
and Kashmir with Pakistan. Moreover, India had its version of Tibet in absorbing
autonomous regions of Nagaland and Sikkim, the former through force.54 Hence, the first
principle of territorial integrity necessitated a common and shared agreement over
borders. Given the problematic and ambiguous nature of the Sino-Indian border and the
status of Tibet and its contiguous regions, the treaty's insistence on the territorial
agreement as a prerequisite for peace had farced into open the differences between Nehru
and Mao in new ways that it had never done before. Thus, the first principle would not
guarantee what it was designed for in the first place. On the surface, the Five Principles
seemed to offer the golden rule for good relations. But its application was subjective to
each country's interests and their status in relation to their accepted borders. When its
invocation was used for different motivations, interpretations, and applications, the Five
Principles posed serious problems. In line with this argument, the status of the
Himalayan frontiers between China and India was a disaster in the making.
Since territorial integrity was instrumental to any peace in the region, the border
question had to be negotiated almost immediately after the ink dried on the Panchscheel
Treaty. Why would Nehru then reject or choose not to discuss the settlement of the
McMahon Line? Nehru provided his rationale for deciding so. When he conceded that
Tibet was part of China in the Panchsheel Treaty, neither side referred directly to the
border problem. Nehru relied on the McMahon Line for India's claims as settled;
sa See John Garver, Protracted Rivalry, on Nagaland, 92 — 94, on Sikkim, 170 —175. See
Nehru's reports on NEFA and Nagaland, Letters to Chief Ministers, Vol.3, 1952-1954, 153-157.
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therefore, there was no point; he thought, of bringing up the subject for discussion during
the Panchsheel talks. In a speech in Parliament, Nehru revealed that he was aware of the
frontier question right from the beginning in 1950. He explained his rationale for not
raising the issue of the McMahon Line during negotiation with the Chinese in 1954.
According to Nehru, the decision was "to make clear in every possible way that our
frontier was, in our opinion, clear in our maps, clear to the world and clear to China, and
clear to our own people, of course." He continued, "Why should we go about asking
China to raise this question when we felt sure about it? Why invite discussion about a
thing on which we had no doubt?"ss
In his letter to his Chief Minister dated July 1, 1954 (three months after the
signing of Panchsheel), Nehru laid out his strategic thinking in relinquishing India's
claim to Tibet and how it directly related to the McMahon Line and Panchsheel. On the
few critics in his government that claimed that India gave up a fundamental right that
should not have been done, Nehru stated that India had no legal claims and could not
"function within Tibet as if Tibet was under our influence."56 The fact, Nehru asserted,
that India would not stop China from claiming Tibet "in any way, nor indeed we had any
legal justification for trying to do so."57 But, he argued, that there was "no giving in at
all" to the Chinese.58 Closely related to this, according to Nehru, were the two important
aspects of this agreement: "that indirectly the question of our long frontier is settled; and
the principles ofnon-aggression and non-interference, etc. (Five Principles) are laid
ss Nehru made several references to this assertion of declaring publicly the McMahon Line as
India's recognized borders. "I have made our position clear in the border issue by statements in Parliament
and later by letters, for ten years now (since 1949). There is no doubt that the Chinese Government knew
about it. They remained silent." See India's Foreign Policy, 351. "One would think that these matters
should have come up for discussion. They did not. I accepted the boundary as it was." Ibid., 352.





down."59 The first of Nehru's assertions was that the McMahon Line was India's and the
second was the fact that the Chinese had signed the treaty, which bound them to adhere to
the Five Principles of respecting India's territorial integrity and thus the McMahon Line.
In Parliament, Nehru argued publicly that India's frontier, including the
McMahon Line, was "a firm one and was not open to discussion.... so that the Chinese
Government might have no doubts about our attitude. I did not think it necessary to
address the Chinese Government on this question because that itself would have shown
some doubt on our part." 60 When the Chinese did not dispute Nehru's public
declaration on Himalayan frontiers, he concluded that the Indian cartographic map
inherited from the British was clear and a matter of fact. Since India recognized China's
claim over Tibet, therefore, the Chinese without contradicting India's claim, must have
acquiesced to the legality of the McMahon Line. He assumed that there must be a quid
pro quo that occurred between the two nations of what they deemed as national
importance to both parties.
In spite of Nehru's bravado that the McMahon Line was an established fact, he
must have felt some anxiety over the frontiers. He estimated that the Panchsheel Treaty
with its Five Principles would serve as restraining order on China's counterclaims on
India's recognized borders. In a speech to the Lok Sabha on September 29, 1954, Nehru
explained:
" It is not a question of believing the other party's word; it is a question of
creating conditions where the other party cannot break its word, or if I might say





61 Jawaharlal Nehru, quoted from Jansen, Afi^o-Asian c~nd Non Alignment, 170.
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In an unpublished circular to the Congress party leaders, Nehru revealed that he was
setting a condition for China's compliance on Panchsheel by sponsoring it to attend
Bandung, "The more frequent China pledge to observe the principles, and the wider the
audience, the more substantial would be the environment and the clearer the moral
interdiction."62 In Nehru's point of view, linking the Chinese to commit to the Five
Principles was the best assurance of the Chinese adhering to it. In Bandung, the Chinese
would now be subjected to the world's court of public opinion. Surely, he reasoned, the
Chinese had all the intentions to abide by the Five Principles.
Additionally, during Nehru's visit to Beijing on October 18, 1954, Nehru raised
the question of some map published in China that showed an incorrect boundary
alignment, Zhou replied that those maps were old and that the Chinese had no time to
revise them.63 Nehru declared explicitly during that conversation that India's recognized
boundary was "clear and well-known and not a matter of argument" and Zhou concurred.
64 That particular discussion seemed to satisfy Nehru.
Yet, the Chinese had not accepted the McMahon Line as a legal claim for India,
but rather an artifact from British imperialism. Given their aversion to unequal treaties,
the Chinese interpretation of unsettled boundaries was based on mutual consultation and
62 Ibid.
63 China, in 1961, concluded border heaties with its neighboring countries: Burma, Nepal, Bhutan
and Pakistan in 1961. For Burma, China signed a border treaty recognizing the Burma's and China's
borders as drawn by the British, essentially the McMahon Line at the Burma/China border. For details of
this delnieation, see John Garver, Protracted Rivalry, 253-254.
64 his conversation is also shown in the Chinese record. See official record by the Ministry of
External Affairs, Government of India, Leading Events, 5. Also see paragraph on Boundary Issue,
"Talking Points from Premier Zhou Bnlai's Second Meeting with Nehru," October 20, 1954, History and
Public Policy Program Digital Archive, PRC FMA 207-00007-04, 27-33. Obtained by Chen Jian.
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121740. (accessed on February 15, 2015).
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renewal of the agreement between "equals" and not just a legacy from the imperial past.6s
Being a revolutionary government, the Chinese would not accept the legality of the
McMahon Line without renegotiation. This fundamental disagreement undernlined the
first principle of "mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty" in Panchsheel
and thus made the entire document untenable at best and a lightening rod for conflict over
borders at worst.
The principles, in essence, were designed for a particular advantage that favored
the status quo. In the first and third principle of "mutual respect for each other's territorial
integrity and sovereignty" and "non interference in each other's affairs" respectively, one
has to "accept the way they are" to avoid conflict. 66 In other words, it is only
advantageous for those who held the upper hand and disastrous for those who happened
to hold the end of the stick. In unsettled boundaries, the nation-state that had the means
to diplomatically and militarily defend its claim had the lopsided advantage against the
other claimant. In the process of legal acceptance of territorial boundary, two stages had
to occur between sovereign states; the defined territories had to be "delimited
(diplomatically agreed) and demarcated (jointly marked out on the ground)." 67 Since
both China and India had an ambiguous understanding and ultimately, a contentious
disagreement on boundary setting, it pushed the urgency for both to demarcate these
territories. As Nehru adroitly remarked on the second principle ofnon-aggression, "What
ss Neville Maxwell, India's China War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970), 92-95.
66 Jansen, Afro African and Non Alignment, 30.
67 Neville Maatwell, "Sino-Indian Border Dispute Reconsidered," Economic &Political Weekly,
Vol. 34, No. 15 (April 10-16, 1999): 906.
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is aggression and what is not aggression depends, of course on where you draw the line
of demarcation."68
Rather than a guarantee of peace and friendly relations, the Five Principles based
on territoriality, ultimately, presented a perfect rationale to carry out policies to enlarge
stakes and areas of control to obtain the most advantage for oneself. Since the Himalayan
frontiers were unsettled, undefined, and not officially delimited (diplomatically agreed),
both countries started probing territories. These probes were necessary to understand the
lay of the frontiers for future negotiations. Once the routine probing of unmarked
territories was perceived as an incursion by one side, the other would accelerate the same
action to safeguard its interests. Lacking mutually agreeable interpretation of their
positions, the race for China and India to probe, delineate and then to demarcate
territories (unilateral marking of posts) became a necessity to maximize their claims in
the Himalayas. Herein lies a basic contradiction of Panchsheel. If the benchmark of
peaceful co-e~stence was centered on "mutual respect for territorial integrity and
sovereignty," therefore, the primacy of physical territories as fixed, marked and claimed
trumped all considerations. It became azero-sum game of who could exert the most gain
in unilateral demarcation.
Indeed, China and India raced to probe and demarcate territories and maximize
them positions in the Himalayas. Both countries started probing territories as early as
1954.69 On July 17, 1954, three months after the signing of the treaty, the PRC protested
against the presence of Indian troops in Barahoti (which the Chinese called Wuje) in the
Uttar Pradesh. It was followed by a protest on June 28, 1955 from the GOI to the PRC of
68 Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, 350.
69 See Leading Events, 4.
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an authorized crossing of a Chinese party in Barahoti. These territorial probes, mostly on
the Chinese side according to the Indian record, caused protests, but they did not
immediately result in a major clash between Nehru and Mao. However, the territorial
probing, patrolling and building outposts intensified year after year. These actions
became a necessity to lay and stake claims. Owing to the ambiguous nature of non-
delineated boundaries, the likelihood of accidental encroachment into each other's
claimed territories raised the stakes for a confrontation. Claims and counterclaims of
trespassing became prevalent and more hostile.
On September 1956, the first threat of arms was reported by the Indian
government against a Chinese patrol who trespassed into the Indian-claimed territory in
Shipki Pass. By 1958, "arrests and detentions" and "ill treatments" were being reported
by the Indian government against the Chinese in the Western sector of the Aksai Chin.70
Additionally, the GOI reported the "construction of permanent or semi-permanent
structures" in Uttar Pradesh. In 1958, India discovered a dirt road constructed by the
PRC across Ladakh, the northwest disputed border, which was considered by the Indian
as part of their territory. The Indian public upon the road's discovery was vehemently
outrage. Within two months in late 1958, there were three incidents reported by the GOI
of aircraft intrusion flying over Tibet on India's airspace.~l
From 1955 to 1958, India lodged formal complaints including protests to the
Chinese government of more than twenty incidents where the Chinese, according to the
'o Ibid., 7.
71 Ironically, these reports of aircraft flying over Indian airspace were later identified as those
operated by Taiwan with tacit approval from India's Intelligence Bureau. See John Kenneth Knaus,
Orphans of the Cold War: America and the Tibetan Struggle for Survival (New York: Public Affairs 1999),
248.
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Indian record, crossed her boundary.72 Then, in early January 1959, Premier Zhou
officially "repudiated the traditional, delimited boundary" that India recognized as its
official borders.73 The Sino-Indian boundary had never been formally delimited and the
McMahon Line, according to Zhou, had never been recognized by the PRC. Therefore,
from the Chinese point of view, renegotiation was in order from a clean slate to settle the
contested boundaries. Subsequently, the claims and counterclaims reached a climes in
1959 when Indian and Chinese forces clashed at the bridge of Longju in the eastern
sector. It was no accident that this confrontation occurred just four months after the Dalai
Lama's escape to India.
III. The Implications of Panchsheel
The Panchscheel Treaty was a remarkable turn of events that led to 1959, the
year of no return for Sino-Indian relations. From the signing of the Panchsheel Treaty in
1954 to the seminal moments of their solidarity in Bandung in 1955 (next chapter), Nehru
continued to speak of one Asia, but his speeches did not have the ring of the vitality of
the past. It became evident that its relevance for Nehru was faltering in the face of
political polarization in the form of collective defense pacts dividing Asians.74 He would
speak of China's friendship less and less, owing to the simmering tensions in Tibet and
'Z Details of border incidents from 1956 to the tail of 1958. See Leading Events, 4- 6.
73 See Leading Events, 8.
74 Initiated by the United States, collective defense started in the formation of lvorth Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO} in 1949 and was followed onwards by military blocs and organizational
groupings "to stem the tide of communism in Asia in this war." Of these alliances, the most important were
tke tripartite treaty between the United States Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS) of 1951, the South -
East Asia Defense Pact (SEATO) in 1954, comprised of the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia,
IrTew Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines and Pakistan. The Baghdad Pact or Central Treaty Organization
(LENTO) in 1955 comprised of Turkey and Iraq later joined by Great Britain, Pakistan and Iran. See,
Philippe Brainard and Mohammad Reza Djalili, The Third World and International Relations (Boulder,
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the Himalayan frontier. Later that year, there were emerging disagreements in the official
cartography of the boundaries. But nothing could withstand the jolts to the relations after
the flight of the Dalai Lama to India on March 31, 1959.
By 1959, Nehru began to doubt the veracity of their relations. The severity of the
impact of the Dalai Lama's escape to India brought to the surface the pent-up Chinese
insecurities. The Chinese accused India of masternlinding the kidnapping of the Dalai
Lama. Nehru decried the use of vituperative language that was reproachful and
unbecoming to behaviors of friendly relations, an affront to India's sense of national
pride. From Nehru's point of view, labeling "unfounded charges gravely impaired" the
first principle of "mutual respect."75 The crisis took a political turn as it played out in the
public domain through newsprints and exchange of notes- between governments as they
were echoed in the debating chambers of the Indian Parliament and the Chinese halls of
Congress. They were often heated and uncompromising. Predictably, the reverberations
were also manifested along the frontiers where both forces would meet face to face.
In 1954, Nehru spoke of China as the partner for peace and against Western
imperialism; by 1959, Nehru was calling into question Sino-Indian relations. As he
grappled with questions during Parliamentary debates about the implications of the
deteriorating situations over contested borders and the Tibetan crisis, he wondered if they
understood each other at all: "I just do not know how the Chinese mind works, I have
been surprised at the recent developments." 76 Or the Chinese actions were "local
75 7awaharlal Nelu~u, Happening in Tibet, statement in Lok Sabha, Agri127, 1959, India's Foreign
Policy, 323.
76 Jawaharlal Nehru, reply to debate in Rajya Sabha, September 10, 1959, on India's borders with
China, India's Foreign Policy, 352.
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aggressiveness or a desire to show us our place."" The Chinese accusations were
uncomprehending for Nehru; as an arbiter for the PRC before, he wondered, "if the
Government of India and Government of China speak quite the same language, and if,
using the same wards or similar words, we mean the same thing."'g In the same vein,
Nehru pondered that there was "a lack of understanding or recognition in China of the
revolution in India....They forget that India is not a country which can not be ignored
even though she may speak in a gentler language."79 In questioning the Chinese
reasoning, he concluded, "In the final analysis, the Chinese have valued India's
friendship only to a very small event."80 In Nehru's candid letters to his Chief
Ministers, he speculated that the Chinese were reverting to the old "Middle Kingdom"
mentality to be treated in patronizing ways because of its "superiority."gl More
purposely, Nehru su1-mised the trouble of having a "strong and united Chinese state,
expansive and pushing out in various directions and full of pride in its growing
strength."82
As the border clashes intensified, both leaders invoked the violation of the Five
Principles.83 In the span of four years, it was extraordinary how the reversal of Nehru's
understanding of China changed. As such, rather than strengthening their relations as the
principles intended to accomplish, the document locked them into conflict by insisting





&1 Jawaharlal Nebru, Letters to Chief Ministers, Volume S, 1958-1964, letter dated October 26,
1959, 310.
82 Ibid., letter dated October 1, 1959, 286.
g3 Zhou's letter reported by Nehru at the Lok Sabha, September 12, 1959, where Zhou accused
Nehru of not abiding to the Five Principles of Nehru's upholding of the McMahon Line. "Does this accord
with the Five Principles advocated by Mr. Nehru?" See India's Foreign Policy, 353.
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Nehru to confront each other more forcefully as they elevated their quarrels on moral
grounds based on Panchsheel. Instead of being an instrument to foster friendly
understanding, the invocation of the Five Principles to justify each other's action
hastened the deterioration of their relations. In other words, bilateral relations and
peaceful co-existence were based on the agreement over what territorial integrity meant.
Thus, the decision to elevate territorial claims as the primary determinant of Sino-Indian
relations led to the impossibility of peace and friendship.
In one of the heated debates in the Indian Parliament on the Tibetan crisis, Nehru
explained that the Himalayan impasse was more than a quarrel about territory but "where
national prestige is involved, it is not the two miles of territory that matter, but the
nation's dignity and self-respect."84 At the end of 1959, Nehru again reiterated his
feelings about the Himalayan frontier, "Where a nation's honor and self-respect are
concerned, one cannot proceed on the basis of barter, haggling and that tactics of the
marketplace."85 This open hostility toward China was a product of opposition over the
meaning and the basis of their peace treaty, one that intensified rather than mitigated
conflict between India and China.
IV. Conclusion
The aim of Panchsheel was to ground China and India to follow a set of
principled guidelines for interstaxe relations. Inaugurated during the signing of the
Panchsheel Treaty of 1954, when China's sovereignty over Tibet was officially
&' Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Approach to the Tibetan Issue, September 4, 1959, India's FoYeign
Policy, 344.
gs Jawaharlal Nehru, Nehra's reply to discussion in Lok Sabha, December 1459, India's Foreign
Policy, 381.
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acknowledged; nonetheless, China and India missed the opportunity to address the
Himalayan contiguous frontiers. As the boundaries had not been delineated before, there
was no need to pin on the borders as definitive rules of friendly relations between them.
That would have to wait after the delineation of borders happened first. But since both
were arixious to cement their friendship, the Five Principles became the unrealistic
panacea for mitigating the contested frontiers.
Owing to the moral implications accompanying Panchsheel, both China and India
were hamstrung by its finality as the only barometer of their friendship. Predictably, the
consequences of unsettled borders and disputed territorial sovereignty became one of the
factors that unraveled the friendship between them. This demonstrates the inherent
contradictions and shortcomings in Panchsheel. Despite that it promoted the adherence to
the Five Principles of Co-e~stence, intrinsic to it was the recognition of mutually agreed
boundary delineation. The treaty forced the debate over these borders to the forefront of
Sino-Indian relations. Both China and India wanted to develop friendship until they
quarreled over the meaning of territorial integrity and sovereignty that was instrumental
to Panchsheel.
When Nehru insisted that "without the shadow of a doubt in my mind that the
McMahon Line is right, map or no map, and we will not allow anybody to come across
that boundary," he violated the fourth principle of "equality and cooperation for mutual
benefit."86 By walking away from dialogue, equitable concession and negotiated
settlement, crucial ingredients to friendly relations, Nehru invalidated Chinese concerns
86 "McMahon Line is right" See discussion in Lok Sabha, December 1959, Jawaharlal Neluu,
India's Foreign Policy, 381. "Map or no Map" see Nehru's replied to H.V. Kamath's inquiry in Parliament
on November 20, 1950. "Our maps show that the McMahon Line is our boundary, and that is our boundary
--- map or no map. That fact remains and we stand by that boundary and we will not allow anybody to
come across that boundary." Letters to Chief Ministers, Vol. 2, 1950 —1952, 302.
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and intentions. In the end, Nehru caved into the dictates of national mandates and
decidedly cast aside the Asian cooperation of which he was the most ardent advocate.
Chapter Three
The 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung
"Thee is no alternative for any country, unless it wants war but to accept the concept
ofpeaceful co-existence. "
-Jawaharlal Nehru
When it comes to Asian internationalism, the Bandung Conference soars above
the rest of Nehru's initiatives in the global arena. The first Asian-African Conference
commemorated an unprecedented moment of Asian diplomacy. Yet, in reality Bandung
was a stage whereby diverse agendas and contradictory goals were on display. Rather
than a highpoint for Asian unity, Bandung would be the turning point for Nehru to realize
that his ideas about Asian solidarity were untenable. Far from the early years when
Nehru met Asian revolutionaries and activists seeking to challenge imperialism, the
Bandung Conference brought together Asian heads ofnation-states to pursue their
national agenda. In the Bandung conference, the importance of state imperatives trumped
any sense of international or regional unity among the delegates. The event underscored
for Nehru the primacy of the nation-state over internationalism and the spirit of Asian
cooperation.
Triumphalist narratives dominate the history of Bandung for the African and
Asian countries. The American e~led activist Richard Wright seemed to echo what
everyone in the formerly colonized world longed to remember. The disenfranchised and
the oppressed met in Bandung to render a clear "judgment upon the Western world."87
87 Richard Wright, The Color Curtain, 12.
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The event's achievement is sluntned up in the words of Indonesian President Sukarno, in
his opening speech, as "the first international conference of colared peoples in the history
of mankind."gg On the surface, Zhou and Nehru exemplified the essence of "Hindi Chini
bhai bhai" (Chinese and Hindus are brothers) in Bandung, a harmonious dance between
two leaders of large Asian states who promoted Peaceful Co-E~stence. But, under the
surface, the Bandung Conference went a long way in deepening mistrust between Nehru
and his Asian colleagues in a way that made the event, like Panchsheel, a critical turning
point away from Nehru's cherished vision of Asian solidarity and cooperation.
Early writings on Bandung focused on international relation accounts that offer
balanced analyses regarding procedural and political insights.89 Drawing from personal
narratives are those books written by eyewitnesses to the event either as journalists or
diplomats.90 Foremost of these books are those penned by former delegates to Bandung:
Kotelawala, Romulo, and Sukarno. These recollections and memories from different
voices, vivid accounts, and inside information provide a certain texture and color that
brought to life the "Babel-like nature" of Bandung. 91 Still, contemporary scholars on
Bandung have examined the conference from other perspectives with a focus on human
rights and racism. One particular study exposed the inherent racism and outright
88 Speech by President Soekarno at the opening of the Asian-African Conference in Indonesia,
The Asian Afi^rcan Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955, Appendix and 39.
89 G.H. Jansen, Afro Asian and Nan Alignment (London: Faber and Faber, 1966); George Kahin,
The Aszan A, frican Conference: Bandung, Indonesia ,April 1955 (New York: Cornell University Press,
1956); A Kimche, The Afro Asian Movement: Ideology and Foreign Policy of the Third World (New York:
Halstead Press 1973).
90 S. J. Kotewala, An Asian Prinze Minister's Story (London: George G. Harrap & Co., 1956);
C.P. Romulo, The Meaning of Bandung (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1956);
Richard Wright, The Color Curtain.
gl For disparate narratives of different voices at Bandung, see Pang Yang, Huei, "The Four Faces
of Bandung: Detainees, Soldiers, Revolutionaries and Statemen," Journal of Contempo~rny Asia, Vol. 39,
No. 1 (February 2009): 63-86.
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hostilities of the Western press against the Chinese Premier, making his triumph in
Bandung even more fabled. 92 Most historians define Bandung as Nehru's greatest
achievement in foreign policy and the most visible and "dramatic demonstration" of
Nehru's Asian internationalism.93 It also has been billed as the "climax of Nehru's
Asianism."94 As a leader and statesman, Nehru's enduring legacy and achievement were
intimately linked to the "year of Bandung."9s
Nation-state imperatives against Nehru's idea of Asian cooperation were glaring
in Bandung. In contrast to the interwar years where cooperation among activists across
borders allowed fluidity in movements against imperialists, Nehru and other Asian
leaders were now confronted with a global landscape dominated by Cold War divisions.
It would seem that the rapid deterioration in the world situation could have prompted the
Asian delegates to join in solidarity; rather, the polarized world tended to separate the
developing nations with their diverging political viewpoint. In Bandung, Nehru would
experience this first hand.
The original impetus for the Bandung Conference emerged with the five Colombo
Powers: India's Nehru, Indonesia's Sukarno, Burma's U Nu, Ceylon's Kotelawala
(neutrals), and Pakistan's Ali (Western-allied). They met in 1954 to discuss the growing
frustration and alienation from Western intrusions in Asia. They raised two specific
issues. The first was the Sino-American tensions in Southeast Asia and their desire to
92 The world's eyes were on the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai as the first PRC leaders to appear in
the international stage. His appearance in Bandung elevated the PRC's position in the international
diplomacy. Premier Zhou attracted the most attention in every session he appeared in. See Sally Percival
Wood, "Zhou Gags Critics in Bandung, How the Media Framed Premier Zhou Enlai at the Bandung
Conference, 1955," Modern Asian Studies 44-45 (2010): 1001-1027, Cambridge University Press 2004.
9~ Judith Brown, Nehru: A Political Life (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 2003), 260.
94 Sobhag Mathur, Spectrum ofNehru's Thought,(New Delhi: Mittal Publication, 1994), 109.
95 Benjamin Zachariah, Nehru (London: Routledge, 2004), 216.
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develop China's peaceful orientation and contact among the Asian and African nations. 96
The second was the determination to place in their hands a more active role in Asian
affairs and to solve Asian problems. 97 From the onset, the Colombo leaders aimed for
Asian cooperation as the means to solve problems of common interest and concern, wrote
the Prime Minister Kotewala of Ceylon. Its goal was to declare to the West that the only
viable peace initiative in the region was through "the one formulated by or approved by
the leaders of Free Asian countries."98
However, among the Colombo Powers themselves, there were differing agendas
that motivated them: For India, Bandung was a forum to promote Panchsheel as an
alternative to military blocs of the Cold War. Kotelawala of Ceylon was concerned about
the big Indian population inside of his country and the threat of subverting its
sovereignty. An anti-communist, he would rattle the committee by raising the
controversial issue of defining communism as the new form of colonialism in Bandung.
Sympathizing with the PRC, Burma, India, and Indonesia wanted to encourage China's
independence from the Soviet Union and end her isolation. Indonesia hoped to gather
support for its claims over West Irian (West Papua) against the Dutch, Pakistan, a
staunch US ally, was prepped up to counter any communist gain in the conference; was
ready to voice out her security concern over India, the fate of the Palestine state, and
generally of the Arab world.99 It was not hard to conclude that the disparate national
g6 After the end of the Korean Wa1• and the settlement of the Indo-China crisis in 1954, a new
crisis arose in the Taiwan Strait. As the US encirclement continued and China's concerns of the US
pushing for "Two Chinas", the PRC launched offensive shelling of Matsu and Jinmen islands, increasing
tensions in the region.
97 See Kahin, The Asian- A. frican Conference, 4-5.
98 S. J. Kotewala, An Asian Prime Minr.'ster's Story (London: George G. Harrap & Co., 1956),
119.
99 Kahin, The Asian- African Conference, 5-7.
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imperatives accompanying the founders of the Bandung Conference would ultimately
lead to further division in Bandung.loo
This chapter contends with older interpretations of Bandung by arguing that the
politics at play in the Asian-African conference countered Nehru's Arianism and
promoted division rather than unity. This argument agrees in many ways with those laid
out by Itty Abraham, although his focus is on race as a determining factor in Nehru's
conceptualization ofAsian internationalism.101 Instead, a reading of Bandung
demonstrates that Asian national leaders of newly created states were inclined to act on
state imperatives, usually along Cold War lines, rather than a sense of collective
internationalism or regionalism. The varied agenda, old and new grievances, perceived
threats real or imagined, rivalries and alliances nearly undermined any meaningful
conclusion to the Asian meeting.
ioo The Soviets' Cenhal Asian states were not invited. The state of Israel was excluded not to
offend the Arab states, who made it clear that they would boycott attending if an invitation to Israel was
extended. Australia and New Zealand were eliminated in the list due to their strong affiliation with the US
and its Western European allies. South Korea and Taiwan were equally disqualified because of their firm
association with the US. While Turkey, Iran, the Philippines and Thailand, the first was a member of
NATO and the latter two were signees of SEATO, were included. The US discouraged these countries from
attending but rescinded due to the fallout of international public relations and as a counter measure to blunt
the anti-Western bashing in Bandung. Indonesia wanted to focus on the question of West Irian (Western
Papua) while Middle Eastern countries were concerned with Palestine and colonialism. There was an
undercurrent rivalry and unexpected clash between Pakistan and India. The final declaration did not reflect
the peaceful co-e~stence language, but instead it was replaced by "live together in peace" as some
delegates were opposed to its inclusion. The Five Principles of Co-existence became ten, which included
the much controversial provision of the "right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively" at the
insistence of Pakistan. Therefore, legitimizing the collective defense that Nehru so opposed. But constraints
were put in place so that particular provisions would not be used "to serve the particular interests of any of
the big powers." See Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non Alignment. Also see Kahin, The Asian African
Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955, 2-4.
lol Iffy Abraham, "From Bandung to NAM: Non-alignment and Indian Foreign Policy, 1947 — 65,
" Commonwealth & CompaYative Politics, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Apri12008). According to Abraham, the
contingent political factors, not moral superiority, were the dominant factors in the formulation of
nonalignment. Ultimately, it won over against Nehru's preference of racial consideration in Bandung.
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Bandung of 1955 was the turning point of the demise of Nehru's idea of one Asia
for what ultimately would become nonalignment, which was entirely distinct from
Nehru's Asian internationalism. 102 Formed primary as a national and political
contingency, the Non-alignment Movement (NAM) was Nehru's answer to India's
determination to stay out of the Great Rivalry between the United States and the Soviet
Union and to assert India's independence to chart peaceful and friendly relations among
interstates regardless of affiliations. As opposed to military might, it addresses a "moral
force or as an instrument of world peace."lo3 Rooted in the interwar years, and as a
guiding principle from pre-independence until 1955, the Asian solidarity was Nehru's
worldview in regional empowerment. It symbolizes Nehru's quest in uniting all Asians to
embody a new Asia through the elimination of all vestiges of colonialism and
imperialism with China as a major partner.
This chapter highlights the two most significant tensions in the political
committee debates in Bandung. In doing so, it analyzes Nehru's thinking as he tried to
unknot the political entanglement that dominated Bandung. The first was the wrangling
over the new definition of coloni~Iism, and the second was the debate for and against a
collective defense system for Asia.lo4 The results of these debates would propel Nehru to
ioz The Non-Aligned Movement was founded and held its first conference (the Belgrade
Conference) in 1961 under the leadership of Josip Broz Tita of Yugoslavia, Gamal Abdel Nasser of
Egypt, Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and Sukarno of Indonesia.103 Michael Brecher, India and world Politics: Krzshna Menon ` s View of the World (New York:
Praeger, 1968) 7- 8.
10` ~ Initiated by the United States, collective defense system started in 1949 in Europe in the
formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Onwards, it followed in the organization of
military blocs, pacts, and groupings, essentially to stem the tide of communism in Asia in this war." The
tripartite treaty ofANZUS in 1951 consisted ofthe United States, Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS)
was of importance; and followed by the South -East Asia Defense Pact (SEATO) in 1954, comprised of the
United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, I~Tew Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines and Pakistan. The
Baghdad Pact or Central Treaty Organization (CEI~ITO} in 1955 comprised of Turkey and Iraq later joined
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rethink his Asian orientation in light of what seemed irreparable disparities among them
and to reexamine his relations with the Chinese.
I. Defining a New Form of Colonialism
As an opening salvo during the deliberation on problems with dependent peoples,
Sir John Kotelawala of Ceylon spoke about a collective resolution against colonialism.
Kotelawala, one of the Colombo Five, argued that "There is another form of colonialism,
however, about which many of us represented here are perhaps less clear in our
minds...." Referring to the recent situations in the satellite states under Communist
domination in Central and Eastern Europe, he asked, "Should it not be our duty to openly
declare our opposition to Soviet colonialism as much as to Western imperialism?"
Predictably, pro-Western countries lined up to support Ceylon. The representative of
Turkey (NATO member) proposed a resolution for the condemnation of "eleven types of
colonialism," while the Lebanese delegate expanded the definition as "Colonialism, Old,
and New," emphasizing that condemnation of colonialism should not only be assigned to
the old form but also on the new form taking shape in Eastern Europe.los
The suggestion that the Soviet Union was an imperialist power engendered an
intense debate that pitted Asian state leaders against one another along the fault-lines of
the Cold War. At the heart of this debate was the overwhelming security perception
posed by the two opposing systems: capitalism and cominunisrn. For the pro-Western
aligned nation-states, the threat was communism, and they sought to condemn it as a new
form of colonialism. For the Eastern-aligned coalition such as China and North Vietnam,
by Great Britain, Pakistan and Iran. See Braillard, Philippe, and Mohammad Reza Djalili. The Thud World
and International Relations (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986), 13.
1°s Jansen, Afro Asia and Non Alignment, 202-205.
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it was the aggression of US imperialism that brought them to Bandung to seek solidarity
among Asians. The Chinese Premier, being allied to the Soviet, countered Ceylon's
characterization of new colonialism and appealed to seek "common ground while
reserving differences."lob Nehru worried that the proceedings would be mired in endless
debate, and he appealed for harmony. He pleaded, "I am not an admirer of the Soviets. I
dislike many of the things they have done, as I dislike many of the things the Western
Powers have done." 107 Nevertheless, he defended the Soviet Union and argued against
its classification as an imperialist.
It was the interconnection of capitalism and imperialism of the Western mold that
predisposed Nehru to be critical of Western imperialism. 108 For him, the Soviet Union
and its October Revolution was a seminal achievement and as an inspiration in the
liberation of the subject peoples. It was precisely this early experience that provided him
with the lasting impression that "Soviet Russia and India were ideal partners against
imperialism."109 In Nehru's estimation, the inherent capitalist exploitation by Western
enterprises such as the British East India company and the Dutch East India company had
perpetuated imperial expansion and tight control over their dominion. The wealth of
Western empires and the subjugation of the colonized peoples were intimately linked in
Nehru's belief. In the words of Krishna Menon, Nehru's chief political adviser, the
l06 See the Supplementary Speech by Premier Zhou Enlai at the Plenary Session of the Asian-
African Conference, China and the Asian African Conference, Documents (Foreign Language Press,
Peking, 1955), 21, 22.
ion Jansen, Afro Asia and Non-Alignment, 205.
ios On the interconnection of capitalists and imperialists, see Michele Louro, A Special ` Blend' of
Nationalzsnz and internationalism, 41.
l09 On Nehru's admiration for the Soviet Union during interwar years, Ibid, 42- 44.
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disposition of Indian foreign policy was that the "West meant Empire."llo Even in the age
of decolonization, Western imperialism continued to reclaim its domination. It was the
reason the French, after the Second World War, desperately fought to retain Indo-China's
status as a colony and its repressive control over Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. For the
Dutch, it was crucial to reassert their neocolonial design over Indonesia, or for the
Portuguese to preserve their enclave in Goa. In this line of thinking, Nehru had always
been critical of Che West but he tended to overlook the Soviet Union's transgressions in
the European satellite states. Therefore, what was occurring in Soviet-controlled Central
and Eastern Europe was not at all comparable to Western imperialism.
The failure to reach a consensus on the question of anti-colonialism struck at the
very core of Nehru's concept of Asian solidarity. The mere fact that the delegates'
disagreement on the definition of anti-imperialism was heavily contentious demonstrated
that it was no longer a cause upon which Asians could agree. Nehru wholly viewed anti-
imperialism as the fundamental basis of Asian solidarity. It was their shared history of
colonialism as a catalyst for activism which unified Asia in the past and present. This
divide among Third World countries was a fissure that would dominate Bandung and the
unity of the Colombo Five.l l l Each camp had a rigid perception of security threats to
their national interests. Either the threat was from the spread of communism or from the
neocolonialism reasserting itself. The discourse on a new form of colonialism in Bandung
signaled a serious weakness in Nehru's Asian internationalism. It was evident that
lio Michael Brecher, India and world Politics: Krishna Menon ` s View of the World (New York:
Praeger, 1968), 301.
111 Among the Colombo Five, Pakistan and Ceylon were anti-communist while India, Burma, and
Indonesia were sympathetic to the socialist camp.
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Nehru's Asianist orientation that brought about global mobilization against empires was
no longer a unifying cause in the polarized world of the Cold War.
III. Peaceful Co-Existence Versus Collective Defense System
Perhaps, the most enduring legacy of Bandung for Nehru was in the political
committee undertaking the promotion of world peace and co-e~stence in Asia. It was in
this seminal moment when Nehru put forth the seeds of his foreign policy doctrine of
what was to become nonalignment. The Western-allied countries such as Iraq, Turkey,
Pakistan, and the Philippines collectively argued for the relevance of military alignment
in the light of the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. In particular, Iraq (member of
the Baghdad Pact) attacked the peaceful co-existence as too nebulous to secure a reliable
deterrence against the Soviet aggression. Turkey (member of NATO) justified collective
defense system as aself-defense for its national security. Belonging to a Western military
bloc was a reassurance and served as the deterrence to possible Soviet intrusion.
Meanwhile, for weaker states in Southeast Asia with a large Chinese diaspora, Chinese
communism represented the biggest threat to their independence. The Philippines made a
case for smaller countries that needed external protection, and it vehemently contradicted
any suggestion that military protection was other than it was, a protection from
colninunist aggression. Therefore, Pakistan (member of CENTO and SEATO}, India's
nemesis, detailed the necessity to include the principle of "self-defense" as an inherent
right of nations added to the declaration of principles in Bandung.
Nehru saw American interventions in Asia as problematic; and he adamantly
opposed the Western-aligned position. According to Nehru, the tendency of the West,
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especially the United States, to prescribe policies to the affairs of Asians without
consultation was insupportable. Nehru was vocal in this regard. Writing candidly to his
Chief Ministers, he complained that the "habit of the West to carry the ` white man's
burden' in the East still continues even though conditions in the world and Asia have
changed greatly." 112 What was inadmissible for the neutrals was the fact that only three
out of eight members were considered Asians in the newly formed South-East Asia
Treaty Organization (SEATO). 113 SEATO was a treaty that was formed as a scheme to
have US military presence felt in Asia, an encirclement designed to isolate China and the
Soviet. Nehru showed his contempt for it as a sham, "The South East Asian Conference
thus is really and principally a European and American Conference without much of Asia
in it. And yet, the problems they deal with will be Asian."114 He berated military pacts:
"Some countries are not only anxious to protect themselves against possible aggression,
but also lay claim to protect other countries, even though the others do not ask for such
protection." lls
That the Asian leaders in Bandung had dismissed Panchscheel, a regionally
derived doctrine, and instead supported military pacts with the West proved to be another
breaking point in Nehru's Asian internationalism. At the climactic political committee
debate, the Deputy Prime Minister Zorlu of Turkey defended the general principle that
"there was no safety for any state except through pacts of collective security," which
llz Jawaharlal Nehru, Letters to Chief Ministers, 1947-64, Vol. 4, 1954 —1957, see letter dated
September 15, 1954, 48.
113 Formed in September 1954, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) members: The
United States, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan.ila Jawaharlal Nehru, Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-64, Vol. 4, 1954 —1957, see letter
September 3, 1954, 36.
its Ibid.
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Nehru repudiated emphatically. 116 Given Nehru's aversion to military alliances, he, with
all his logic, could not fathom the denigration of losing one's freedom of self-
determination to a superpower whether to the Soviets or the United States. In his mind,
no country should be prepared to give up its inherent right to independent judgment.
The idea of surrendering one's independence was abhorrent to Nehru, "It is an intolerable
thought to ine that the great countries of Asia and Africa should come out of bondage into
freedom only to degrade themselves or humiliate themselves in this way." 117 He had
healthy suspicions that the superpowers were self-serving in forming these pacts not
merely for the collective security but to extending their spheres of influence in Asia.
Installing military bases could not guarantee stability in the region. The reverse was true
according to Nehru. The militarization of the region only increased fear, insecurity and
tensions, lis
In answering the Turk, Nehru affirmed his conviction that any nation-state joining
the United States or the Soviet Union was dividing the world and acting in direct
violation of Panchscheel. In spite of the compulsions of the sma11 states to seek security
from the big powers, there would be no guaranteed security. Recognizing the lopsided
partnership based on the power politics of collective defense, Nehru succinctly explained
this inherent inequality, "There is no friendship when nations are not equal, when one
had to obey the other and when one dominates the other."119 If security was imperative,
116 See Jansen, "High Noon at Bandung, "Afro Asian and Non-Alignment, 209. Turkey, Lebanon,
Iran, Iraq, Pakistan were US aligned.
11' Kahin, The Asian- African Conference, 67.
lls On SEATO, see Jawaharlal Nehru, speech during a debate on Foreign Affairs in Lok Sabha,
September 29, 1954, Indza's Foreign Policy, 87 — 93.
1~ Jawaharlal Nehru, excerpt from the Closing Speech by Prime Minister Nehru at the Asian-
African Conference, Apri124, 1955. The Asian African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955,
Append.
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it was through peaceful co-e~stence that would be the best guarantee. Coming to
Bandung, Nehru's game plan was to take back the Asian agenda into the hands of Asians
and to implore the new independent states to stand by peaceful co-e~stence rather than
join either the competing blocs. Military pacts or any collective defense systems, in his
mind, were designed to subvert Asians into the ideological war between the US and the
Soviet Union. The struggle between them had little to do with economic development
and domestic concerns vital to the newly formed states.
Urging his colleagues in Bandung to subscribe to a common and shared policy for
the region, Nehru deployed the language of peaceful coe~stence. As armament had
become overtly dangerous with the power of the super bombs to annihilate, Nehru urged
his audience to make a difference and to take the right action. "Are we going to throw
our weight on the scales on the side of peace or war?" 120 Nehru declared, "T'here is no
alternative for any country unless it wants war but to accept the concept of peaceful co-
e~stence."121 Only in peaceful co-e~stence and independence from the bipolarity of
ideological camps would there be viable solution to world peace:
" If all the world were to be divided up between these two big blocs what would
be the result? The inevitable result would be war. Therefore every step that takes
place in reducing that unaligned area is a dangerous step and leads to war."122
The unaligned area Nehru spoke about was the balancing buffer, a shield between two
contesting poles as he sought to enlarge the neutral ground as an area of peace. From
izo Jawaharlal Nehru, speech by Prime Minister Nehru before the Political Committee of the
Asian-African Conference, Apri122, 1955, The Asian African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April
1955, 66.
lzl Ibid., 67.
iZZ Ibid., 66. Also see Iffy Abraham, "From Bandung to NAM: Non-alignment and Indian Foreign
Policy, 1947 — 65, "Commonwealth &Comparative Politics, Vol. 4b, No. 2 (Apri12008): 206.
o•
this angle, Nehru, the undisputed leader of the neutral states, saw a clear utility and
purpose of India's "independence in eternal affairs" in expanding the unaligned area.lz3
t~s the vast majority of Asian and African countries had won their freedom, an intensive
competition, according to Nehru, between "the rival blocs for the soul of these newly
independent countries" was at stake.124 The more nation-states he could convince to align
themselves to the neutral column, the larger the area he could claim for peace and
stability in the region. The unaligned area of neutrality was crucial to the balance of
power between the warring camps. In this vein, Nehru was forn~ing a viable alternative
for those developing countries whose wishes were not to be dominated by any of the big
powers.
Nehru made clear that "If I join any of these big groups, I lose my identity; I have
no identity left, I have no views left...I belonged to neither, and I propose to belong to
neither whatever happens in the world."125 In this speech, Nehru essentially declared his
doctrine: one was either for Panchsheel or alignment. By situating his position
irrevocably on the side of Panchsheel, Nehru had cast the fate of the Sino-Indian relations
unintentionally. Nehru, perhaps unaware at that time, would make a clean break away
from his long-held conception that China was India's "sister in the East." 126 In the
ensuing years to came, indeed, he would speak less and less of Asian solidarity and
China as a partner and more of peaceful co-existence.
123 Krishna Menon defined the soon to be nonalignment as, "It is merely independence in external
affairs." Quoted from Michael Brecher, India and world Politics: Kr-ishna Menon ` s View of the World
(New York: Praeger, 1968), 3-4.
iza Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, 84.
its 
~~d.
lz6 On a number of occasions Nehru referred to China as India's ` great sister in the East.' Glimpses
of World History, 270. Also see China as a sister nation as quoted, "Let us go to India's sister in ancient
history —China." Ibid.,28.
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For Nehru, an Asian entity could be straddling either position: neutrality or
alignment to either camp as Bandung clearly demonstrated in its proceedings and
deliberations. But anation-state that truly professed neutrality, without affiliation to any
of the two big powers, regardless whether it was Asian, African, Middle Eastern, Latin
American or European, must adhere to the principle of peaceful coexistence. Asianism
was regional in scope whereas adherents to Panchsheel belonged to a bigger tent of an
international community seeking peace. It was not enough for a country to adhere to
Panchsheel, as China did during the Panchsheel Agreement in 1954, but also for that
country nat to affiliate itself to either the socialist or the capitalist camp. Advocating for
peaceful co-existence and belonging in the sphere of a military bloc were politically non-
congruous, as he would later fmd out as the Chinese taught him in 1962 when they went
to war. Looking back at the formation of nonalignment from one of Nehru's close
foreign policy advisers, Menon recalled the rationale behind it, "non-aligned nation must
be non-aligned with the non-aligned" to form a rational and cohesive coalition for peace.
12' After Bandung, Nehru must have realized that a partnership with China was
illogical.128 He must have come to the conclusion that aSoviet-aligned country, like
China, could not be an honest broker or partner for peace.
127 Krishna Menon reflecting on the formation of nonalignment to be effective and truly
independent, "non-aligned nation must be non-aligned with the non-aligned." See India and World Politics:
Krishna Menon's View of the World, 13.
i~$ Divergent of directional paths between Nehru and Mao as Mao pursued a more radical
revolutionary prescription in domestic and international spheres. Initiated in 1957 during his declaration
that the ` Bast Wind was prevailing over the West Wind," which essentially charted that the "forces of
socialism have become overwhelmingly superior to the forces of imperialism." See Mao Zedong, Speech
at the Moscow Meeting of Communist and Workers parties (November 18, 1957), Quotations from
Chairman Mao Tse-Tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), 80-81. Also see John W.
Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 2001), 121-124.
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IlI. Conclusion
Bandung was a watershed for Nehru. The fact that he declined to support a
proposal for a second Bandung by Indonesia's Sukarno as early as in 1956, and
subsequently by the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai to convene it, speaks volume of how his
perceptions of Asian cohesion had changed over time. X29 In truth, Nehru would employ
his diplomatic skills to suppress any possible staging of another Bandung.13o He
caustically remarked while reporting to the Parliament that the conference m Bandung at
least "wisely avoided any provision for setting up an additional machinery of
international cooperation."131 This statement reveals just how distinct Nehru's outlook
had become on the prospects of organizing another international body for Asian
advancement. Nehru's conclusion was hardly unexpected given the depth of
dissimilarities among Asians; he mLtst have fathomed that the Asian unity he was seeking
was simply untenable. Being part of the same geographical spaces would not necessarily
translate into common objectives.
lz9 
"Nehru feels that the current conditions are not yet ripe." The Chinese Ambassador of Syria
and the Syrian Foreign Minister discuss the timing of the Second Asian-African Conference. Februaxy 11,
1957. "Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Syria, 'The Situation of Ambassador Chen's Visit to the Syrian
Foreign Minister'," History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, PRC FMA 107-00250-06, 51-52.
Translated by Jeffrey Wang. http://di~italarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114822 (accessed October 6,
2015). "India was not enthusiastic over the prospect of a Second Bandung Conference, because the
Chinese Communists were pressing for such a conference." The memo continued, "The prime minister
[Nehru] compared this situation to the fast Bandung at that time the Arab states had wished to utilize it in
their dispute with Israel. He added he made himself unpopular at the time of the first conference with his
insistence that local issues be left aside." See Memorandum of Conversation dated August 24, 1962 —
Jawaharlal Nehru, Howard Jones, Ambassador to Indonesia and B.E.L. Timmons, Minister Counselor,
American Embassy, New Delhi. See National Security Files, Box 107, October 25, 1962, John F. Kennedy
Library, Boston, MA.
13o India's political decision to undermine the foi-~nulation of the Second Bandung conference, see
Itty Abraham, "From Bandung to NAM: Non-alignment and Indian Foreign Policy, 1947 — 65, "
Commonwealth &Comparative Politics, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Apri12008): 206.131 Jawaharlal Nehru, quoted from Jansen, Afiro Asian and Non Alignment, 221.
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In Bandung, the Asian incongruities were pronounced in the number of clashes
between the pro-Western group, who were militarily allied with the US, and the non-
allied nation-states which were pushing for peaceful co-existence. Given the diversity of
political, economic, conflicting national interests and social systems in Bandung, it
became obvious to Nehru that his dream of one Asia would never come to fruition. The
Third World countries brought with them their national imperatives and Cold War
allegiances. Either it was for security for small countries such as the Philippines and
Thailand seeking protection from a military bloc, or it was a big country like China
seeking temporary alignment in peaceful co-e~stence to puncture the US containment
and its isolation. Understandably, it became the flashpoint for Nehru to abandon his
Asian internationalism and the beginning of his detachment from China as a partner. In
the Belgrade Conference in 1961, Nehru promulgated the Non-Aligned Movement, a




"Words like Bandzrng and Panchsheel have begun to lose their shine and
to be hurled about without meanie »r3zg...
- Jawaharlal Nehru
Jawaharlal Nehru's fascination with Asian concerns, identity and solidarity was
integral to his nationalist identity. Formed many years before he assumed the role of the
first prime minister of newly independent India, its main characteristic was a global
outlook nurtured by the Indian liberation movement against Western imperialism and
colonialism. Nehru's scope of national liberation struggle widened into an Asian-driven
priority, as it became the axis round that his Indian foreign policy turned. Notable in its
center was China. At the spokes were the East and Southeast Asian, and ultimately the
African nation states, whose unity Nehru sought and strived to influence. Attached to
this idea was the Asian reawakening with China as the partner for its peaceful rise.
In the resurgence of Asia, two celebrated moments stand out at the intersection of
Asian solidarity and China's friendship with Nehru, Panchsheel and the first Asian-
African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia. Panchsheel, or the Five Principles of
Peaceful Co-e~stence became the basis of China's and India's interstate relations.
Bandung, the first gathering of its kind, enabled the Third World to define their national
aspirations and to chart their independent course of actions. Acclauned as hallmarks of
Asian solidarity, the mandates of national interests severely tested both Panchsheel and
Bandung. In the postcolonial era, the perceived threat of Great Power rivalry placed
e~reme stresses on the vulnerable newly independent states. The outcome of which was
132 Jawaharlal Nehru, from reply to debate on Tibet in Rajya Sabha, May 4, 1959, see India's
Foreign Policy, 326.
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the triumph of national imperatives over the spirit of internationalism that preoccupied
Nehru for so long.
In Panchsheel, the inherent ambiguities of boundary inheritance in the Himalayas
and competing sovereignty claims over territorial frontiers overwhelmed China's and
India's desire to build relations based on mutual trust for the benefit of peace. Both
sought cooperation until their national agendas infringed on their friendship. The treaty
itself bound and handicapped both China and India to an imposed restriction on territories
both of them could not agree. Consequently, the premise of Panchsheel was critically
undermined. As territoriality and territorial possession evolved as the recognized
criterion of legitimacy in statehood; thus, nationalist impulses prevailed in the conduct of
state affairs dealing with the unsettled Himalayan territories and boundaries. The Five
Principles could be subverted and used as a political weapon to justify moral positions to
advance their individual national cause. By walking away from negotiated settlement,
Nehru relinquished his long cherished sentiment of Asian unity.
In convening Bandung, Nehru sought Asian. solidarity. However, the essential
catalyst for such cooperation was missing. Asia was as diverse as its geography was vast,
widely varied in races, culture and beliefs, and profoundly divided along the fault-lines of
the Cold War. National concerns, problems, and ambitions preoccupied each Asian
nation-state. Once again the imperatives of national priorities, security and geopolitics
undermined the Asian cooperation called for in the spirit of Bandung. Ultimately, it
would be the turning point for Nehru to realize that his Asian sentiment was a myth. In
the end, Bandung signaled a complete break for Nehru, leaving behind his idea of one
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